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___________________________________________________________ 
We study a coordination scheme in a two echelon supply chain.  It involves sharing 
details of replenishment rules, lead-times, demand patterns and tuning the replenishment rules 
to exploit the supply chain’s cost structure. We examine four different coordination strategies; 
naïve operation, local optimisation, global optimisation and altruistic behaviour on behalf of 
the retailer. 
We assume the retailer and the manufacturer use the Order-Up-To policy to determine 
replenishment orders and end consumers demand is a stationary i.i.d. random variable. We 
derive the variance of the retailer’s order rate and inventory levels and the variance of the 
manufacturer’s order rate and inventory levels.   We initially assume that costs in the supply 
chain are directly proportional to these variances (and later the standard deviations) and 
investigate the options available to the supply chain members for minimising costs. 
Our results show that if the retailer takes responsibility for supply chain cost reduction 
and acts altruistically by dampening his order variability, then the performance enhancement 
is robust to both the actual costs in the supply chain and to a naïve or uncooperative 
manufacturer. Superior performance is achievable if firms coordinate their actions and if they 
find ways to re-allocate the supply chain gain. 
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1. Introduction 
We study a two-echelon supply chain model consisting of a retailer and a manufacturer 
reacting to stationary i.i.d. stochastic consumer demand. Both echelons implement a periodic 
review Order-Up-To (OUT) replenishment policy. The inventory position is reviewed every 
period (e.g. daily, weekly) and an order is placed to raise the inventory position up to an 
order-up-to or base stock level that determines the order (production) quantities.  
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When making replenishment decisions two primary factors must be considered. Firstly, 
a replenishment rule has an impact on order variability (as measured by the bullwhip effect, 
i.e. the ratio of the variance of orders over the variance of demand) shown to the manufacturer 
(or supplier). Secondly, the replenishment rule has an impact on the variance of the net stock 
(as measured by the net stock amplification, i.e., the ratio of net stock variance over the 
variance of demand).  
It is well known that reducing the bullwhip effect has an adverse effect on the net stock 
amplification and consequently on customer service, Disney, Farasyn, Lambrecht, Towill and 
Van de Velde (2006a). In other words, bullwhip reduction comes at a price. This is a key 
trade-off faced by the actors in a supply chain. In order to capture both aspects mentioned 
above, we develop a generalized Order-Up-To policy that includes a proportional controller in 
order to be able to alter its dynamic response.  
Both echelons implement the generalized OUT policy and consequently incur costs that 
we assume to be directly proportional to the long term variance of the inventory level and the 
long term variance of the replenishment orders. The combined total cost of the retailer and 
manufacturer has to be minimized. This can be done in several ways. One possibility is that 
both the retailer and the manufacturer act independently and minimize their own local costs. 
The objective of this paper however, is to ascertain whether a global optimization will result 
in superior performance. The supply chain coordination is not only realized through demand 
information sharing, but the actors also have to share information with respect to the 
parameters of the replenishment rules used and the lead-times. This is of course a far more 
advanced coordination scheme than what is often proposed in the literature. 
The major contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows. We examine OUT 
policies in a multi echelon environment aiming at minimizing both the impact of bullwhip and 
net stock amplification (which determines the safety stock required) through a local or global 
optimization procedure. Several supply chain coordination mechanisms are proposed. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews pertinent literature. In section 3 
the generalized Order-Up-To policy is introduced. We use two metrics to measure 
performance; the order variance metric (bullwhip) and the inventory variance metric 
(indicating the safety stock needed). These measures are quantified for the retailer in section 4 
and for the manufacturer in section 5. Combining these metrics into one objective function 
allows us to measure total supply chain performance. In section 6 we analyse the impact of 
supply chain members who are primarily concerned with optimizing their own single echelon 
objectives. In section 7, the supply chain members aim at a global optimum by coordinating 
the replenishment policies. A near optimal, but easy to implement policy is introduced in 
section 8. Section 9 presents the results from an investigation with an alternative objective 
function based on the standard deviation, rather than the variance, of the fluctuations in the 
net stock levels and order rates.  Section 10 briefly discusses some of the practical issues 
involved in each of the four coordination strategies. Section 11 concludes. 
2. Literature background 
The problem introduced in section 1 is multi-facetted. There is no literature available 
dealing with all parts simultaneously. Important insights however, can be obtained from 
analysis of the separate elements of the problem. We therefore shortly review the literature on 
bullwhip quantification in multi-echelon environments, smoothing replenishment rules, the 
quantification of the inventory variance, information sharing and supply chain coordination.  
Lee, Padmanabhan and Wang (2004) offer an excellent up-to date review of the 
bullwhip effect. Chen, Drezner, Ryan and Simchi-Levi (2000) quantify the bullwhip effect 
and show that the classical OUT policy with exponential smoothing and moving average 
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forecasting for auto regressive demands always results in bullwhip. This work was extended 
by Dejonckheere, Disney, Lambrecht and Towill (2003a).  Chatfield, Kim, Harrison and 
Hayya (2004) investigate the impact of stochastic lead-times, information quality and 
information sharing in the OUT policy via a simulation experiment.  
Recent work on smoothing replenishment rules can be also found in Dejonckheere, 
Disney, Lambrecht and Towill (2003a, 2003b) and Balakrishnan, Geunes and Pangburn 
(2004). Hoberg, Bradley and Thonemann (2004) analyzed the effect of three inventory 
policies (inventory on-hand, installation-stock and echelon-stock policies) on supply chain 
performance. Various authors quantify the bullwhip under i.i.d., AR, ARMA and ARIMA 
demand processes (for example see, Zhang (2004) and Gilbert (2005)). 
The issue of inventory variance also has a long history. Vassian (1955) developed a 
periodic review rule resulting in a minimum inventory variance to any sequence of 
forecasting errors. Magee (1956, 1958) also produced pioneering work on the development of 
smoothing rules (our analysis builds on the work of Magee). Other key papers were written by 
Deziel and Eilon (1967) and Simon (1952). More recent work can be found in Graves (1999), 
Disney and Towill (2003), Warburton (2004a, 2004b) and Disney, Farasyn, Lambrecht, 
Towill and Van de Velde (2006a). 
Recently a lot of attention has been directed towards the value of information sharing in 
supply chains. We refer to Chen, Drezner, Ryan and Simchi-Levi (2000), Lee and Whang 
(2000) and Dejonckheere, Disney, Lambrecht and Towill (2004). They all conclude that the 
bullwhip effect can be reduced, but not eliminated by centralizing demand information.  The 
advantages and issues involved in advanced supply chain coordination schemes are provided 
by Holweg et al (2005).  Although the specific scheme we propose herein is not explicitly 
discussed in Holweg et al (2005), some of the issues involved are revealed there.  
In his excellent review paper on supply chain coordination Cachon (2003) emphasises 
coordination actions and transfer payments that ensures each firm’s objective becomes 
aligned with the supply chain’s objective. This approach results in buyback contracts, 
revenue-sharing contracts, quantity-flexibility contracts, sales-rebate contracts and quantity-
discount contracts. Cachon and Lariviere (2005) discuss revenue sharing contracts and their 
relationship to other types of contracts in supply chains with risk-neutral agents. Gan, Sethi 
and Yan (2004) investigate decision making by risk adverse agents in a supply chain. In this 
paper we suggest a method to improve supply chain performance by coordinating, or aligning, 
the parameters of replenishment rules.  To our knowledge the only similar paper we know of 
is Hosoda and Disney (2006), where the role of the proportional controller was studied in 
relation to supply chain inventory costs with AR(1) demand. 
3. The generalized Order-Up-To replenishment policy 
We assume demand is a stationary i.i.d. random process with a positive mean, 
DD  4 , greater than four standard deviations of the demand variance to ensure the 
likelihood of negative demand is negligible.  For such a demand process the Order-Up-To 
(OUT) is an appropriate replenishment policy to generate orders on either the supplier or a 
production process.   The order produced by the OUT policy is defined by 
 tt SO inventory position,        (1) 
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where tO  is the ordering decision made at the end of period t. The inventory position equals 
the net stock (NS) plus the inventory on order (Work In Progress or WIP). The net stock 
equals inventory on hand minus backlog thus, 
tttt WIPNSDaTpO  ˆ)1(
)ˆ.()ˆ(ˆ tttttt WIPDTpNSDaDO                       (2) 
where; tDa ˆ  can be viewed as a target net stock (safety stock), tDTp ˆ.  as a target pipeline stock 
(on order inventory), where is Tp is the physical lead-time, and the unit of forecasted demand 
is to cover the review period. In (2) we have decomposed the original formula into three 
components: a demand forecast, a net stock discrepancy term and a WIP or pipeline 
discrepancy term, see Dejonckheere, Disney, Lambrecht and Towill (2003a).  We will also 
introduce a proportional controller, 1/Ti, into the classical OUT policy in order be able to tune 
the dynamic response.  
Ti
WIPDTp
Ti
NSDaDO tttttt
 ˆ.ˆˆ                      (3) 
We call (3) the generalized OUT replenishment policy. The proportional controller is a 
common control engineering technique used by hardware engineers to dampen the response 
of dynamic systems.  Indeed, the first modern control system, the Maxwell Governor, which 
proved so useful in the industrial revolution for controlling the velocity of steam powered 
machinery, has a proportional controller in its velocity feedback loop.  It is the most simple 
control engineering technique for this purpose, but others, such as the PI controller, also exist 
– see, for example Towill, Evans and Cheema (1997).   
The proportional controller also has a long - but largely unnoticed - history in inventory 
control, for example see Magee (1956).  An obvious alternative to the matched controllers in 
(3) would be to use unmatched, or independent, proportional controllers, as detailed in Disney 
and Towill (2002). Using this approach it is important to consider stability issues as the 
system has a much wider range of possible dynamic responses.  However, for the objective 
function used in this paper (the sum of the inventory and order variances), it is not possible 
for unmatched controllers to show superior performance over the matched controllers and 
thus we ignore this case here. 
As we have assumed the demand is stationary i.i.d. the best possible forecast for all 
future demands is Dt DD ˆ , that is, to set the forecast tDˆ , to a time invariant constant D , 
equal to the unconditional mean of the demand process, D .  Arguably this is a special case 
but it does allow us to proceed with the detailed analysis.
Expression (3) reduces to 
Ti
WIPDTpNSDaDO ttt
).(  .                                                                           (4) 
After substitution (see Disney et al., (2006a)) we obtain 
Ti
OD
OO tttt
)( 1
1


 .                                                                                                 (5) 
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If Ti =1 expression (5) reduces to tt DO  . The order quantity is exactly equal to the 
consumer demand as the replenishment rule has simply “passed on orders”. Importantly, for 
Ti >1 the generalized OUT policy will create a smoothed replenishment pattern and for Ti <1 
bullwhip is created. 
4. The retailer’s order and inventory variance 
Let us now start to construct our supply chain model by first considering the retailer.   
The retailer’s demand from the consumers is a stationary i.i.d. random process. In section 6 
we assume the retailer incurs two types of costs; one directly proportional to the long-run 
variance of the retailers inventory level and the other directly proportional to the long-run 
variance of the retailer replenishment orders placed on the supplier (manufacturer).    So we 
wish to quantify these variances produced by the retailer’s replenishment rule.   This has 
already been achieved by Dejonckheere, Disney, Farasyn, Janssen, Lambrecht, Towill and 
Van de Velde (2002) and Disney, Farasyn, Lambrecht, Towill and Van de Velde (2006a) and 
we now summarise their results.   The retailers order variance is given by 
12
1
2
2
 TiD
RO


          (6) 
in which 2D  denotes the variance of consumer demand and 2RO  is the variance of orders 
placed by the retailer on the manufacturer.   Interestingly we note that under the assumptions 
of; stationary i.i.d demand, forecasts generated by conditional expectation, and matched 
feedback controllers, bullwhip is independent of the lead-time, Tp. If either of these 
assumptions are not meet, than the bullwhip effect does depend upon the lead-time, Tp.  The 
classical OUT ( 1Ti ) policy’s order rate variance amplification ratio is unity.  By using Ti>1 
the generalised OUT policy will remove order variance amplification. 
The variance of the retailer’s net stock is (inventory on hand minus backlog) given by 
  



 12
1
12
11 2
2
2
2
Ti
TiTp
Ti
TiTp
D
RNS

 .     (7) 
2
RNS  denotes the variance of the retailers net stock.  From (7) we observe that for this policy 
with stationary i.i.d. demand:  
 If Ti =1, i.e. a “chase sales” strategy is adopted, then the inventory variance is 1 + Tp. In 
this case the retailer simply passes on the consumers demand to the manufacturer, that is, the 
retailer “passes on orders”. 
 If Ti >1 or Ti < 1 then inventory variance increases.  
 Inventory variance is always greater than 1+Tp, highlighting the fallacy of a zero inventory 
target with our policy.  
 Inventory variance contains a lead-time component, Tp1 , and a smoothing component, 
12
)1( 2


Ti
Ti .  
 Decreasing the lead-time (Tp) reduces inventory variance. 
 The longer the lead-time the smaller the relative importance of Ti on inventory variance. 
 The inventory variance approaches Tp+Ti/2 asymptotically as the lead-time increases. 
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 For a “level scheduling” strategy, Ti , in which case the inventory variance is  .   
When Tp=1 (a further assumption we will make later in order to ease the exposition of 
our investigation on the manufacturer in the supply chain) equation (7) reduces to 
 
12
12
2
2
1,


Ti
TiTi
D
TpRNS

 .        (8) 
For completeness we note that the variance of WIP is given by (9), which is of the same 
form as the smoothing component in the inventory variance equation. 
12
)1( 2
2
2


Ti
Ti
D
WIP

           (9) 
5. The manufacturer’s order and inventory variance 
The manufacturer responds to the retailer’s orders and we assume that he uses our 
modified OUT policy (3) for scheduling production.  Thus we may couple two generalised 
OUT policies together and investigate the manufacturers order and inventory variance.   For 
simplicity, we assume, from this point on for the rest of the paper unless explicitly stated, a 
unit replenishment lead-time at both the retailer and the manufacturer.  However, for 
completeness, the general lead-time case is detailed in the Appendix. Interested readers may 
use the expressions in the appendix to explore scenarios where the manufacturer’s lead-time 
is greater than unity.   It is remarkable to note that the retailer’s lead-time does not influence 
the order variances at either echelon of the supply chain.   In fact, the retailer’s lead-time only 
affects the retailer’s inventory levels, whilst the manufacturer’s lead-time influences both the 
manufacturer’s order and inventory variance.
The retailers order process, after passing through the generalised OUT policy, is now 
auto-correlated.  Thus, we exploit this structural information to forecast both the demand over 
the lead-time and the demand in the period after the lead-time with conditional expectation.     
This alters the way in which the target pipeline content ( tDTp ˆ.  in (3)) and the target net stock 
( tDa ˆ  in (3)) is calculated in the generalised OUT policy, but has the advantage of generating 
optimal forecasts.  These forecasts are optimal in the sense that they minimise the mean 
squared error between the forecast and its realisation over the lead-time and review period.  
More details can be found in the Appendix where a control theory derivation of the 
manufacturer’s order and inventory variance is presented.   Here it will suffice to just present 
our results.   The manufacturers order variance for the case when Tp=Mp=1 is given by 
         
    12112
4162514421)1(2
4
242
2
2


TiTiMiTiMi
TiTiTiTiMiTiTiTiTiTiTiMi
D
MO

  (10) 
and the manufacturer’s inventory variance when Tp=Mp=1 is given by 
 
  4
222
2
2
12
)12(21
TiMi
MiTiTiMi
D
MNS


  
  24
22 1
12
21
TiTiMi
TiMi 
     (11) 
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where, Ti is the retailer’s proportional feedback controller, as before, and Mi is the 
corresponding feedback controller in the manufacturer’s replenishment policy.  The limit 
values of (10) and (11) contain some interesting insights.  When Ti approaches infinity, the 
manufacturers order and inventory variances both go to zero.  This is due to the fact that the 
retail orders are simply a constant (equal to the mean demand).  When the manufacturers 
feedback gain, Mi, approaches infinity, the variance of the manufacturers net stock is infinite.  
This is because the net stock is now an accumulation of random variables and is non-
stationary with no natural mean.  Equation (11) shows that increasing Ti will reduce the 
manufacturers inventory requirements, but increasing Mi will increase the manufacturers 
inventory requirements. 
In the following sections, we develop several supply chain policies ranging from local 
optimization to global optimization. 
6. The sequential optimisation scenario: The self-serving focus 
In order to test various supply chain policies, we have to define a cost function to be 
used. We assume that the costs in the supply chain are linearly related to the variance of the 
order rate and inventory levels at each echelon in the supply chain. For example, we assume 
the inventory holding and shortage costs are linearly related to the inventory variance, and 
production / replenishment on-costs resulting from variable schedules are linearly related to 
the order variance. Furthermore we assume inventory variance is equally as costly as order 
variance.  
This cost function may of course be subject of debate. The 22  and MNSRNS   terms are 
directly linked to the safety stock needed (see Disney et al. (2006a)) and consequently cover 
inventory holding costs of the safety stock and backorder costs. The 22  and MORO   terms are 
linked to production switching costs or adjustments costs due to order rate changes (capacity 
adjustment costs). We consider order rate variance as equally important as inventory level 
variance. It is however perfectly possible that the bullwhip may be more costly then inventory 
variance amplification or vice versa, depending on the context. In this case we have to apply 
weights to these factors. This may change the shape of the cost curves that are derived in this 
paper. We refer to Disney, Towill and Van de Velde (2004), for an investigation on such 
weighting schemes. Alternative objective cost functions are also discussed in Kim and Ryan 
(2003), Disney and Grubbström (2004) and Chen and Disney (2003). 
6.1. The selfish retailer 
First, let us consider the retailer. If the retailer only incurs inventory related costs (that is 
the costs related to the order variance are constant or zero) then the retailer costs are given by 
(7) and the optimal behaviour of the retailer is to set Ti=1 as minimising (7) w.r.t. Ti results in 
Ti*=1. 
However if the retailer has both inventory and order related costs then his costs are 
given by (12), 
12
22
2
2
2
2
£ 
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Ti
TiTiR
D
RNS
D
RO



         (12) 
which is plotted in Figure 1 together with (6) and (7). 
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Figure 1.  The i.i.d. one echelon variability trade-off  
Now differentiating (12) w.r.t. Ti yields   221
212
Ti
TiTi

 , solving for zero gradient and 
selecting the relevant root yields the optimum Ti to minimise the sum of bullwhip and 
inventory variance.  It is 2
51* Ti , that we will recognise as the “Golden Ratio”.  So, the 
optimal Ti in this case has a long mathematical history. 
For illustration we have simulated the “golden” response (i.e. Ti set to the Golden Ratio) 
to an i.i.d. random demand pattern when Tp=1, see Figure 2.  The frequency histograms refer 
to a simulation 10,000 time periods in length.  We can see that after 10,000 time periods the 
statistical process is reasonably close to the theoretical values of Bullwhip (0.447) and 
inventory variance (2.171).   Simulating for a longer time period will obviously reduce this 
error. 
Figure 2.  Sample simulation of the “golden” solution 
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6.2 The selfish manufacturer 
Now let us consider the manufacturer.   If the retailer has used Ti=1 to minimise the 
retailers  inventory costs, the manufacturer faces a demand pattern that is exactly equal to the 
consumers demand as the retailer has simply “passed on the orders”.   The manufacturer’s 
variance ratio and cost analysis in this case is exactly the same as the retailer’s variance trade-
off.  Thus our previous remarks in Section 6.1 for the retailer hold for the manufacturer.   That 
is the manufacturer’s cost and the optimal feedback controller, Mi*, are given by (12) and the 
golden ratio respectively1.  
However, if the retailer has used the golden Ti in the inventory and WIP feedback loops, 
then the manufacturer’s demand process has changed, and thus, his actions now have different 
consequences.   Let us illustrate further.  Using (10) and (11), with Ti equal to the golden 
ratio, the manufacturer’s order and inventory variance (and their sum) is shown in Figure 3.  
Figure 3. The manufacturer’s variance trade-off with a golden retailer 
Figure 3 shows there is a much greater region of order smoothing in the manufacturers 
replenishment policy with a golden retailer as the manufacturers order variance is less than 
unity for all Mi>0.939219. The manufacturer’s local cost when both inventory and order 
variance costs are present is given by 
       12512515 2550549536105516 4£   MiMi MiMiMiM .    (13) 
Differentiating (13) w.r.t. Mi, solving for zero gradient and selecting the relevant root 
yields 
*
,  TiNSOMi = 1.69694.         (14) 
1 With the appropriate change in notation; Ti→Mi
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However, if the manufacturer’s cost function consists of costs associated with the 
variance of the inventory levels only, then the cost function to be minimised is 
      1251 53855316 4£   MiMiMiM .       (15) 
Again minimising (14) w.r.t Mi yields,  
* ,TiNSMi 1.          (16) 
Summarising our results from the sequential local optimisation of the supply chain we 
have developed the following table that details the feedback gains and the resulting costs.  
Manufacturer incurs 
Inventory variance costs only Inventory and order variance costs 
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Ti* = 1.61803
Mi* = 1
R£ = 2.61803
M£ = 1.11146
SC£ = 3.72946 
Ti* = 1.61803
Mi* = 1.69694
R£ = 2.61803
M£ = 1.661384
SC£ = 4.299418 
Table 1. The self-serving solutions  
7. The global optimisation problem: Supply chain coordination 
In this section we will show that the self-serving focus results in poor performance by 
considering what happens when supply chain members coordinate the replenishment 
decisions.   Equations (6), (7), (10) and (11) allow us to explore the complete solution space 
for feedback design in our supply chain. More specifically, we can compute the values of the 
feedback controllers that the supply chain parties can use to improve overall costs. For 
example, the following contour plots (Figure 4) illustrate the performance of the supply chain 
for all possible settings. 
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Manufacturer incurs 
Inventory variance costs only Inventory and order variance costs 
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Figure 4. The complete supply chain total cost solution space with costs related to the 
variance of order rates and inventory levels
Using numerical techniques we have been able to find the actual optimal settings for Ti
and Mi to minimise global supply chain costs as shown in Table 2. 
Manufacturer incurs 
Inventory variance costs only Inventory and order variance costs 
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R£ = 2.46828
M£ = 0.657735
SC£ = 3.12156 
Ti* = 2.62241
Mi* = 1.7603
R£ = 2.6201
M£ = 0.939129
SC£ = 3.55922 
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Ti* = 2.56065
Mi* = 1
R£ = 2.833627
M£ = 0.547575
SC£ = 3.3812 
Ti* = 2.87954
Mi* = 1.76846
R£ =2 .951647
M£ = 0.829541
SC£ = 3.78119 
Table 2. The global optimum supply chain solutions
Disney, S.M., Lambrecht, M., Towill, D.R. and Van de Velde, W., (2008) “The value of coordination in a two echelon supply chain:  
Sharing information, policies and parameters”, IIE Transactions, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp341–355. 
By comparing the £SC in Table 1 and 2, we observe that supply chain gains are realized by a 
global optimization (for all scenarios).  The coordinating mechanism dominates the non-
coordinating mechanism. The supply chain gain, however, is allocated to the manufacturer 
and the retailer incurs higher costs. This of course will not result in a coordination policy. 
Cachon (2003) describes what is needed to coordinate the supply chain: “if a coordinating 
contract can allocate rents arbitrarily, then there always exists a contract that Pareto dominates 
a non-coordinating contract, i.e. each firm’s profit is no worse off and at least one firm is 
strictly better off with the coordinating contract”. 
Therefore part of the supply chain gain has to be allocated to the retailer so that the 
retailer has an economic incentive to cooperate. For all scenarios the gain is large enough to 
compensate the cost increase of the retailer. That means that the cost of the retailer, after 
allocation, is not worse and the manufacturer is strictly better off with coordination.  
In the global solution, Ti  is larger than in the local optimization solution. Consequently 
the retailer will incur a larger variance of the inventory level which results in a higher level of 
safety stock to guarantee a given level of customer service. The extra investment in safety 
stock has to be compensated by the supply chain gain in order to motivate the retailer to 
participate. This can be realized by a lower price charged by the manufacturer. 
In Table 3 we quantify a naïve solution of 1 MiTi  to benchmark a practice quite 
often found in industry. In this case the members of the supply chain are interested in 
minimizing investment in inventory and consequently follow a naïve JIT strategy.  
We can see that the naïve solution (that is not accommodating for the supply chain cost 
structures and failing to tune replenishment rules accordingly) is always more costly than the 
case where supply chain players act rationally and minimize their local costs. Superior 
performance occurs when supply chain players “think outside the box” and act to minimize 
global supply chain costs. 
Ti=1
Mi=1 
Manufacturer incurs 
Inventory variance costs only Inventory and order variance costs 
Re
tai
ler
 in
cu
rs 
In
ve
nto
ry
 
va
ria
nc
e 
co
sts
 on
ly R£ = 2
M£ = 2
SC£ = 4 
R£ = 2
M£ = 3
SC£ = 5 
In
ve
nto
ry
 
an
d o
rd
er 
va
ria
nc
e 
co
sts
 R£ = 3
M£ = 2
SC£ = 5 
R£ = 3
M£ = 3
SC£ = 6 
Table 3. The naïve solution
8. The altruistic retailer  
As indicated by Cachon (2003), supply chain members may consider the coordination 
mechanism (and the corresponding contracts) costly and complicated. Our global 
optimization policy requires that (i) forecasts are generated with conditional expectation, (ii) a 
proportional OUT policy is employed throughout the supply chain (iii) that the feedback 
controllers are globally optimized. This may be hard to implement. We therefore suggest in 
this section an “easier to implement” policy. We will compare the results of this strategy with 
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the three previous policies (the local optimum solution, the global optimum solution and the 
naïve solution). 
We assume that the manufacturer is following a low inventory policy and sets 1Mi . 
The retailer however, is willing and able to alter his replenishment rule to incorporate a 
proportional controller in the feedback rule. We call this policy the “altruistic retailer” policy. 
The results are shown in Table 4. 
As can be seen from Table 4, the altruistic retailer can obtain near optimal performance 
for the supply chain by a proper reaction (i.e., by tuning the feedback controllers of the 
replenishment rule) to the non-cooperative manufacturer.  In fact the performance is within 
5% of the true optimum when the manufacturer has both inventory and order variance costs; 
there is no difference in the costs if the manufacturer has only inventory variance costs. 
Mi=1 Manufacturer incurs Inventory variance costs only Inventory and order variance costs 
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Ti = 2.87386
R£ = 2.739587
M£ = 0.990137
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 Ti = 2.56065
R£ = 2.833627
M£ = 0.547575
SC£ = 3.3812 
Ti = 3.09894
R£ = 3.039953
M£ = 0.890773
SC£ = 3.930725 
Table 4. The altruistic retailer 
9. Linking the variance ratios to costs in the supply chain 
In this section we will quickly explore an alternative cost function based on a more 
traditional, OR / inventory theory approach.  Some costs may be assumed to be constant or 
independent of the inventory levels or orders, but we simply ignore them here. Such costs 
may be materials, energy and administration overheads, for example.  However to capture the 
costs that may reasonably be assumed to be dependent on the inventory levels and order rates 
we will assume;  
 a linear system with normally distributed demand,  
 piece-wise linear, convex inventory holding costs (of  

 
otherwise 0
0 if tt NSNSH , thus H is a the 
unit cost of holding a unit in inventory per period),
 piece-wise linear, convex backlog costs (of 

 
otherwise 0
0 if )( tt NSNSB , thus B is the cost of a 
backlog per unit per period), 
 and we set the safety stock target     11* 2   HBHBerfk NS  to achieve the 
economic stock-out probability2, 
then the inventory related costs will be given by (Disney et al (2006b)), 
2 erf-1 is the inverse error function. 
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 


2costs Backlog  Holding
2
1 12
min
$


 


HB
Berf
NS eHBI .     (17) 
We notice from (17) that the inventory holding and backlog costs are linearly related to 
the standard deviation of the net stock levels.   
In a similar manner, if there are; 
 piece-wise linear, convex lost capacity costs (of    

 
otherwise 0
 if DSOODSN tt , where S
is the slack capacity above the mean demand rate and N is the cost per unit per period of 
not producing to the available production capacity)  
 piece-wise linear, convex over-time costs (of    

 
otherwise 0
 if DSODSOP tt , where P is 
the cost per unit per period of producing in over-time) 
 and we invest in enough capacity (above / below average demand) to achieve an economic 
over-time probability,    1* 12OS erf N P N P       , 
then the bullwhip related costs are equal to (Disney et al (2006b), 
 


2costs time-Over capacity Lost 
2
1 21
min
$






PN
Nerf
O ePNC .    (18) 
Eq (18) shows us that the bullwhip costs are linearly related to the standard deviation of 
the order rates.   Thus, it is interesting to investigate an objective function where the standard 
deviations, rather than the variances, of the inventory levels and order rates are used as 
building blocks.   
For ease of exposition, we will restrict ourselves here to the case where the standard 
deviations of the inventory levels and order rates are equally weighted; that is when H=N and 
B=P (or interestingly when H=P and B=N) at both echelons.  This change to the objective 
function has a number of implications, but we note that major conclusions we have drawn so-
far remain qualitatively unchanged.  
Consider first the local optimisation collaboration scheme; the self serving solutions 
outlined in section 6.  The objective function for the retailer when only inventory costs are 
present becomes 
12
2
£  Ti
TiTpR RNS ,         (19) 
and the feedback gain that minimises the retailers cost is Ti=1.  This is the same result as 
before when we considered the variance of the inventory levels and it implies that the 
manufacturer faces i.i.d. demand when the retailer considers only his inventory cost are 
important.   However, when the retailer has costs related to the standard deviation of both 
inventory levels and order rates the objective function becomes 
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1 2
£  Ti
TiTp
Ti
R RNSRO  .      (20) 
Minimising (18) w.r.t. Ti results in the following expression for Ti*, 
  
      











3/13/2
3/13/2
3/13/2
121
42122
1211
2
1*
TpTp
TpTpTp
TpTp
Ti .    (21) 
We notice that the golden ratio solution no longer exists and the optimal Ti* is now 
dependent on the retailers lead-time, Tp.    
Analytical analysis of the manufacturers standard deviation costs is rather lengthy, and 
thus we resort to a numerical investigations for the case of Tp=Mp=1, although we remind 
readers the expressions for the general lead-time case are shown in the appendix. The 
complete solution space is portrayed graphically in Figure 5.  Figure 5 is very similar to 
Figure 4; enough so, that our major conclusions (altruistic behaviour on behalf of the retailer 
with either a smart or naïve manufacturer, improves overall supply chain performance) remain 
unchanged, although absolute numbers are slightly different.    
Table 5, details the four specific supply chain cooperation strategies for the different 
cost structures.  Again, the internal relationships and its relationship to the self-serving 
solutions remain intact.   
Manufacturer incurs
Inventory standard  
deviation costs only
Inventory and order standard 
deviation costs
Naive Local Altruistic Global Naive Local Altruistic Global 
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ly Ti 1 1 3.54149 3.54149 1 1 5.52083 5.0266 Mi 1 1 1 1 1 2.29663 1 1.80792 
R£ 1.41421 1.41421 1.74981 1.74981 1.41421 1.41421 2.00881 2.27938 
M£ 1.41421 1.41421 0.561212 0.56121 2.41421 2.09849 0.859025 0.86359 
SC£ 2.82843 2.82843 2.31102 2.31102 3.82843 3.51271 2.86783 2.8162 
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Ti 1 2.29663 4.60159 4.60159 1 2.29663 6.50865 6.10356 
Mi 1 1 1 1 1 2.11951 1 1.73876 
R£ 2.41421 2.09849 2.24157 2.24157 2.41421 2.09849 2.4157 2.37816 
M£ 1.41421 0.80851 0.44196 0.44196 2.41421 1.45936 0.75344 0.74684 
SC£ 3.82843 2.907 2.68577 2.68577 4.82843 3.55786 3.16914 3.125 
Table 5. The supply chain solutions when costs are linearly related to the standard 
deviation 
To summarise all of our investigations considered in this paper, we have standardised 
(by defining the naïve designs costs as 100%) all of the costs in the different supply chain 
collaboration schemes with both the variance and standard deviation versions of our objective 
function. These are shown in Table 6.   Again we highlight that the head-line results are 
similar for both cost functions (variance or standard deviations). 
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Figure 5.   The complete chain total cost solution space with costs related to the standard 
deviation of order rates and inventory levels 
For the naïve strategy, players in the supply only need to operate with standard 
replenishment software and have a standard trading relationship with their customers and 
suppliers.   It is an easy option.  But the naïve strategy results in an inefficient use of 
inventory and capacity. So to improve their performance, players should make re-engineering 
efforts to minimise lead-times and additionally create the most accurate forecasts they can 
achieve.  These changes will directly improve business performance.  Indeed, these efforts are 
required for all supply chains and will reduce inventory requirements in supply chains. 
More perceptive “players” will try to understand their own cost structures, demand 
patterns and tune their replenishment rules in order to minimise their own local costs.  This 
may be an appropriate strategy if a player; 
 has a very large customer or supply base, 
 is geographically or culturally separated, 
 unwilling or unable to collaborate with others.   
In order to be tune the OUT policy in the manner we have investigated here, some 
adjustments to computer code or decision support systems may be required.  For example a 
grocery retailer we have worked with has actually re-coded their in-house, bespoke 
replenishment system to incorporate a proportional controller in the WIP and inventory 
feedback loops. Other companies we have worked with who have standard ERP software 
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have exploited spreadsheet based decision support systems to assist replenishment analysts 
when they conduct final conformation of replenishment decisions.  
Manufacturer incurs 
Inventory costs only Inventory and order costs 
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Supply 
chain design
Variance 
costs 
Standard 
deviation costs 
Supply chain 
design 
Variance 
costs 
Standard 
deviation costs 
Naïve 100 100 Naïve 100 100 
Self serving 100 100 Self serving 92.36 91.75 
Altruistic 78.04 81.71 Altruistic 74.59 74.91 
Globally 
optimal 78.04 81.71 
Globally 
optimal 71.18 73.56 
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Supply 
chain design
Variance 
costs 
Standard 
deviation costs 
Supply chain 
design  
Variance 
costs 
Standard 
deviation costs 
Naïve 100 100 Naïve 100 100 
Self serving 74.59 75.93 Self serving 71.66 73.69 
Altruistic 67.62 70.15 Altruistic 65.51 65.63 
Globally 
optimal 67.62 70.15 
Globally 
optimal 63.02 64.72 
Table 6.  Standardised cost summary of all our investigations 
10. Practical considerations 
The global optimisation strategy requires players to first intimately understand their own 
business, as well as other players cost structures, demand patterns and replenishment rules 
and to be able to tune their replenishment rules appropriately.   Furthermore, some agreement 
has to be reached to re-allocate the supply chain “gains” between the players.  This should be 
possible as the global optimisation strategy Pareto dominates the self serving solution. 
However in a supply chain with an extended vendor base, it may be difficult to gain the 
commitment from the large number of suppliers and the re-engineering effort will increase 
substantially. 
The altruistic retailer strategy, although not as efficient as the global optimal strategy 
has good performance with considerably less effort as there are no supply chain re-
engineering requirements essential to the manufacturer.  It only requires the retailer to 
understand cost structures, demand rates, lead-times and replenishment rules throughout the 
supply chain. It may also not even be necessary to have a formal re-allocation of the supply 
chain gain.  This could be redistributed though traditional pricing polices and the willingness 
of manufacturers to accept cost reductions over time.   
Other attractions may also exist for the retailer to behave altruistically. For example, the 
UK grocery company who has reduced the bullwhip produced by their replenishment rules 
(via incorporating a proportional controller discussed therein) did so in order to reduce the 
workload variability in their warehouse and transportation activities.  Furthermore, from a 
queuing theory viewpoint, bullwhip reduction may actually have a compensating effect on 
inventory requirements due to reduced manufacturing lead-times, Boute et al (2006).   This 
may help to offset the predicted extra inventory investment at the retailer.  This will be 
especially important for retailers concerned about maintaining a wide product range with 
correspondingly large requirements for shelf space. 
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11. Summary 
We have developed a discrete time dynamic model of a two-echelon supply chain using 
a z-transform methodology.  The supply chain implements a modified OUT policy to place 
replenishment / production orders.  We have modified the OUT policy by incorporating a 
proportional controller in the inventory and the “orders placed but not yet received” feedback 
loops.  Using this model we have quantified the order and inventory variance at both echelons 
of the supply chain.   
Four different cost scenarios were constructed using the variance expressions and four 
different optimisation strategies where undertaken; a naïve solution, a local optimum solution, 
an altruistic retailer solution, and a global optimum solution. The naïve solution resulted in 
the worst performance. Interestingly, when total supply chain costs are considered, the classic 
OUT policy is not optimal in a multi-echelon scenario, even with only inventory variance 
costs.   
We demonstrated this with three different optimisation strategies.  The first of these was 
a local optimisation strategy where the retailer first tuned his replenishment rule to minimise 
his costs and the manufacturer then tuned his replenishment rule accordingly.  This improved 
the performance of the supply chain from a global perspective, but was not globally optimal.   
This global optimal was identified from our variance ratios numerically and plotted 
graphically.  Inspection of these results, lead us to the final scenario where action as only 
taken by the retailer.  Although this scenario is not optimal, reasonable performance from the 
supply chain could be achieved from the altruistic retailer, without re-engineering efforts at 
the manufacturer.
In order to achieve this coordination scheme, supply chain players need to share 
information about demand patterns, replenishment policies, parameter settings and lead-times. 
We concede that this may be difficult to achieve.  However, our experience suggests that both 
retailers and manufacturers may have other incentives over and above the supply chain gains 
we have discussed here to undertake such seemingly altruistic behaviour.   
We have assumed in our analysis, a linear system and thus some level of operational 
proficiency is required in the supply chain.  It would be interesting to conduct some analysis 
of the impact of non-linear aspects on our findings.  This might include; random lead-times, 
capacity constraints and lost sales, amongst others.  The approach of Chatfield et al (2004) 
maybe useful here. Other extensions to this research could include an investigation of the 
impact of more echelons, or more manufacturers.  
Finally it is interesting to note that in our simple two-echelon supply chain model, the 
best result comes from the players acting in the best interest of the supply chain, and not by 
the players acting solely in their own immediate interest.   This is in contrast to Adam Smith, 
for example, who argued that the best result for a group resulted from each individual player 
acting solely in own interests.  It is however congruent with the arguments of John Nash.  
Superior performance is achievable if firms coordinate their actions. 
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Appendix A. Derivation of the variance ratios 
The retailer’s variance ratios 
Using basic control theory we may construct the following block diagram of our supply chain 
model.  Rearranging the block diagram (Figure A.1) using standard techniques (we refer 
readers to Nise (1995) for a general introduction to control theory) yields the transfer function 
of the retailers order rate.  It is; 
 
   11  zTi
z
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zRO .                                                                                           (A.1) 
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The inverse z-transform of (A.1) yields the time domain solution 
  ttt TiTiro  11 ,                                                                                   (A.2) 
where t is the time index. Using Tsypkin’s Relation, we know 


0
2
2
2
)(
tInput
Output tf
  (Tsypkin, 
1962), which we may apply directly to (A.2) to yield (A.3).  We refer to Disney and Towill 
(2003) for more details on this technique.  
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Figure A1.  Block diagram of our supply chain model  
The retailer’s inventory levels are similarly described by 
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The time domain solution is 
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where h[.] is the Heaviside step function.   Using Tsypkin’s relation, the retailer inventory 
variance is given by 
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The manufacturer’s variance ratios 
In Figure A.1 there are two constants; a and b.  They are given by 
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Rearranging the block diagram yields the manufacturers order rate which is given by 
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Taking the inverse z-transform, surrenders the manufacturers time domain response, 
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and the order variance is given by 
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The manufacturer’s net stock time domain response is given by 
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After substitution (A.10) the sum becomes 
Disney, S.M., Lambrecht, M., Towill, D.R. and Van de Velde, W., (2008) “The value of coordination in a two echelon supply chain:  
Sharing information, policies and parameters”, IIE Transactions, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp341–355. 
 
   











 

 



















 


t
n
n
MpMp
Mpn
nMpn
Mp
t Ti
Ti
Ti
MpnhTiTiTi
Mi
Mi
TiTiMi
Ti
Mi
mns
0
11
1
1
2
1
]1[11
11 . 
           (A.12) 
which, as Mp is an integer and Mp≥0, (A.12) converges to, 
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Now, the required variance expression of the manufacturer’s net stock is given by, 
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Which is equivalent to 
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